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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Paris COP21 has been presented as both a diplomatic success and a victory for
common sense, representing considerable progress in overcoming the dead-
lock the United Nations negotiation process had been in since Copenhagen
COP15. Its ambition is indeed great and unprecedented. However, upon closer
examination of the contents of the agreement, the COP21 epitomizes old, and
perhaps even growing difﬁculties that negotiators meet when discussing an
urgently needed global, strong, and binding compromise.
Proposed by many economists but absent from the Paris Agreement, is the
deﬁnition of an international price of carbon emission, which appears in
practice extremely hard to achieve and insufﬁcient to counter biodiversity
loss or achieve broad environmental goals. It is, nevertheless, very much a
precondition for international sustainable production and consumption, since
price is the foremost economic signal to help orient economic players. It
stimulates investments and innovation in cleaner production processes and
provides a new source of ﬁnancing for public policies, be they environmental
or developmental.
As of this writing, the most important regional greenhouse gas (GHG)
pricing system is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Spearhead of the European climate policy, this carbon market has since its
inception been used as a model by other countries and regions. However,
tradable emission markets are ridden with many structural ﬂaws, which result
in a ﬁnal pricing of the carbon tonne that is much too low. Prices thus lose
their incentive function and virtuous players—those economic agents who
have already started to invest in clean technologies—are found to be at a
disadvantage.
Among the many identiﬁable reasons accounting for international inertia in
the ﬁeld, it appears that the weakness of prices (i.e., taxes and carbon market
prices) might be related to a reasonable fear of competitiveness loss, notably in
heavy industries (Branger, Quirion, and Chevallier 2013). Indeed, one of the
predominant political arguments for such low prices to internalize environ-
mental externalities1 is the (real or conjectured) loss of competitiveness for
local businesses in a globalized economy. According to this argument, local
enterprises are confronted with international competitors that would indeed
be either exempt of environmental charges, or, if they exist, under less
constraining regulations. Businesses respectful of environmental regulations
are therefore forced to accept international competitiveness loss or offshore
their production to countries with less constraining frameworks, thus annihi-
lating efforts made in virtuous countries.
In order to avoid such perverse economic and environmental effects,
several developed countries, such as France and the United States (US),
have been devising adjustment systems to guarantee the efﬁciency of their
environmental policies. These mechanisms are called ‘border carbon adjust-
ments’ (BCAs). A BCA is a tariff measure that internalizes carbon emissions
into the price of a given imported product. It is, therefore, a ﬁscal instru-
ment, which is used in complement of carbon emissions reduction tools,
such as a carbon market or a carbon tax, and targets internationally traded
goods. Its primary objective is to level the playing ﬁeld between domestic
producers facing costly climate change measures and foreign producers
facing very few.
France and Italy have repeatedly demonstrated their interest in such
mechanisms at the European level: BCAs would be enforced in the most
energy-intensive sectors (e.g., those that bear simultaneously the weight of
environmental regulation and international competition), and would target
selectively those countries that have not undertaken appropriate commit-
ments, according to their capacity and responsibility in climate change,
within the international legal framework on climate change (France 2009:
article 2). Another example is the 2009 US Waxman–Markey Bill, which
set both a BCA mechanism and a tradable emissions permit market.2 Other
developed countries, such as Japan and Australia, are studying diverse solu-
tions, and will inevitably be inﬂuenced by their European and American
counterparts. In Europe, however, strong opposition to such initiatives
persists, most notably in the United Kingdom. The same obviously applies
to developing countries, although some voices have been raised in favour of
1 Externalities are external effects created by an economic agent’s activity trading a free
advantage, or a damage (climate degradation for instance), without monetary compensation.
2 The tradable GHG emissions permits market could have been created in 2012 at the federal
level in the US, but was rejected by the Senate (Schott and Fickling 2010).
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BCAs (Mattoo and Subramanian 2013) amidst a growing recognition of the
need for a satisfying global framework.3
In the scientiﬁc literature, BCAs are also controversial. The foremost
argument against their enforcement contends that such unilateral measures
are mere kludges. The universal enforcement of a carbon price would be
more relevant and efﬁcient (Markusen 1975). Houser et al. (2008), as well as
Dröge et al. (2009), further argue that it could slow down international
cooperation on climate change, trigger economic retaliation, and foster a
return to protectionism, or stimulate emission reduction costs transfers
through trade effects. However, considering the weakly binding and limited
country-level mitigation provisions reached under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), unilateral action
is likely more useful than the status quo (OECD 2014). Moreover, their
virtuous effect on competitiveness,4 and even in increasing global efﬁciency
(Böhringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford 2012), is well documented in the
growing economic literature (OECD 2014).
Based on the discrepancy between the urgency of climate issues and the
meagre results achieved in international negotiations, this chapter weighs
the usefulness of BCAs as a complement to strong regional or domestic
environmental regulation. This leads us to discuss the interplay of economic
competitiveness and climate change, before the economic challenges posed by
BCAs in order to reach fairness in its design and implementation (Section 4.2).
Section 4.3 sheds light upon the legality of BCAs according to international
trade law, while Section 4.4 provides an assessment of policy-related implica-
tions. It outlines, in particular, how BCAs could be used as an engine of a
necessary economic transition, for developed and developing countries equal-
ly, according to the common but differentiated responsibilities principle.
4 .2 BCA IMPLEMENTATION
Environmental policy instruments fall into two categories: they are either
of a regulatory (e.g., quotas, standards, certiﬁcations) or economic (e.g., taxes,
tradable emission permits—TEPs)5 nature. In both cases, they intend to
internalize environmental externalities. BCAs can be perceived as commercial
3 In 2010, India declared its intention to bring BCA measures before the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body, but has since softened its stance, based on the
idea that developed countries cannot simultaneously commit to a signiﬁcant reduction of their
emissions and bear the weight of a large reduction of their economic activity (OECD 2014).
4 See, in particular, Demailly and Quirion (2008: 497–504). Other economists defend a
contrary position, as Weber and Peters (2009: 432–40).
5 TEPs can also be referred to as ‘tradable emission quotas’ or ‘carbon markets’.
62 Climate Policy
measures devised to level the playing ﬁeld between domestic and foreign
players whose position before environmental regulation is asymmetrical. For
instance, if European producers, notably those from energy-intensive sectors,
compensate rising costs linked to the implementation of the EU ETS on the
ﬁnal customer, they might lose domestic market shares to foreign competitors.
Conversely, if they do not apply such compensation, their proﬁts, and over
time, their investments will shrink, which will reduce their ability to win. In the
end, it may lead to a transfer of investments from European companies to
foreignmarkets, as well as a joint loss of market shares on domestic and foreign
markets, resulting in severe job loss and a rise of GHG emissions outside
Europe—in other words, in carbon leakage, with its two main components:
• An ‘operational leakage’; that is, the operational delocalization of a
domestic business, induced by environmental constraints, to less regu-
lated foreign markets.
• An ‘investment leakage’; that is, the redirection of investment ﬂows from
environmentally regulated domestic markets to foreign countries where
such regulatory framework is absent.
The implementation of a BCA requires a clear deﬁnition of its ﬁeld of
application, in terms of product scope, instruments, and countries, leading to
the following questions.
4.2.1 Which Regulating Instrument(s)?
Most climate policies use a combination of instruments, but market signals
have often been a major segment of such measures.6 Indeed, when dealing
with environmental issues and in debates regarding the implementation of a
BCA, economic instruments have largely been favoured instead of regulatory
instruments. They aim to encourage, through price signals, the voluntary
modiﬁcation of behaviours to reduce pollution.
In general, BCAs may consist in (i) a tax on imported products based on
taxes applied on similar domestic products (tax adjustment on imports);
(ii) tax credits on exported products (tax adjustment on exports); (iii)mandatory
acquisition of emission permits in sectors where carbon leaks have been
identiﬁed; or (iv) the allocation of free permits for those sectors subject to
high competition. The deﬁnition of a BCA depends as well on pre-existing
instruments in the regulated zone. A border carbon tax may supplement a
carbon tax on polluting activities of a given country or zone, or complement a
carbon market. Tradable permits cannot be added to a carbon tax because they
6 For an analysis of environmental taxes and carbon markets, see Bueb (2014).
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require an operating carbon market—they would take the form of purchased,
allocated, or restituted permits instead (see Figure 4.1).
4.2.2 How to Evaluate the Carbon Content of Imported Products?
Whatever form a BCA might take, it bears on processes and not products—it
is blind to the product itself. The global political sensitivity of BCA enforce-
ment renders precise deﬁnition of sectors and products extremely critical. It
is important to evaluate correctly the carbon content of products in order to








T1 Final tax, similar to VAT, for goods sold on 
domestic territory. Its amount is proportionate to the
carbon content of goods sold on domestic territory. 
T2 Paid at each step of the production process,the
costs of this tax can be transferred to the consumer 
of the product, thus significantly encouraging ‘green’
processes through cumulative effects.  
T3 Although carbon constraint exemptions can
eliminate incentives to shift to environmental-
friendly processes, it minimizes domestic
disadvantages for domestic companies on 
international markets.These credits also encourage
businesses with different production sites to export
the most emission-intensive goods, while keeping 
the less-intensive for their domestic market. 
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mechanisms
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nonetheless, depend on elasticities and market’s
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betweeen domestic and foreign players if TEP
allocation is even partially free.
TEP 3  Holds difficulties related to CDM/JIM,
problems mostly due to carbon credit  attribution and
opacity of the process.
TEP 4 See T3.
Figure 4.1. Tradable emission permits.
Note: CDM: Clean Development Mechanism; JIM: Joint Implementation Mechanism.
Source: Authors’ illustration.
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to countries’ regulations and throughout production processes and across
sectors:
• Considering country regulations, environmental constraints differ and
the application of distinct BCAs according to each target country is
difﬁcult due to the amount of information needed to correctly evaluate
and categorize environmental regulations.
• On the product side, two similar products from the same sector, pro-
duced by similar companies, can have starkly different emission rates.
Within a single sector, similar goods can also be produced with very
different methods and thus have very different carbon contents: the
quantity of energy used depends on where it is produced and/or trans-
ported; the quality of energy used relates to the primary source of energy
(gas or coal), even if the ﬁnal energy used is the same.
These differences of carbon content would entail varied BCAs on similar
products, which would be very difﬁcult to implement.
Moreover, all importers should be subjected to emissions reduction obli-
gations to prevent environmental dumping. Yet, prices (i.e., tax value or the
purchase price of a permit bought by importers) need to be uniform (for
instance, based on average values). In practice, such a uniform price may
suppress individual countries’ and/or individual companies’ initiatives
regarding emissions reduction, with virtuous players remaining compara-
tively unrewarded for their efforts. There would therefore be no incentive to
invest in clean technology. A differentiated BCA system would reward
efforts in emissions reduction, but in practice still appears unmanageable.
To lessen the problem, a ﬁrst alternative could be to encourage importing
companies to willingly pass an audit on the carbon content of their products.
Another option would be demanding that companies give veriﬁable evidence
of environmental regulation compliance, for instance through a certifying
body. Such a disposition might, however, prove difﬁcult to require from
small importers considering the high administrative costs involved, in add-
ition to possibly being considered discriminating, since not all companies
would be subjected to this requirement.
Two other approaches, applied in conjunction or independently, are pro-
posed in the literature: ‘top-down’ methods, using input–output analysis to
estimate embodied energy, CO2 emissions, pollutants, and land appropriation
of international trade activities, and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, based on the
calculation of embodied carbon through the examination of production pro-
cesses of speciﬁc products. The former seems too broad and, therefore, not
easy to apply. The latter, more realistic, involves two methods: the ‘best
available technology’ (BAT) and the ‘predominant method of production’
(PMP). According to the PMP method, the country of import would apply a
BCA by assessing the carbon embedded in an import in relation to its own
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domestic production processes (Zhang 2010: 19). As for the BAT method, the
country of import would apply a border adjustment by assessing the carbon
embedded in an import compared to what the carbon emissions would be if
the best available technology had been used (Ireland 2010).
The BAT is likely the best method. It serves as a reference to assess the carbon
content of imported goods, making carbon content evaluation by an independ-
ent organism easier through the application of a single procedure used as an
international standard. Furthermore, such a measure would elude the issue of
cleaner foreign goods than those manufactured in the regulated zone.7 Offering
an impartial criterion, the BAT could possibly obtain international approval and
allow for the deﬁnition of international standards of production. Such approach
to evaluate the carbon content of products leads, however, to a comparative
assessment of production methods and processes, which might admittedly also
be difﬁcult to put into practice. Bearing in mind that BAT references do not take
indirect emissions into account (for instance, emissions due to transportation)
and also because of the difﬁculties ﬁrms have in evaluating their energy mix, the
relevance of the BAT method for audits may be challenged.
4.2.3 Which Countries Would Be Affected?
Due to the existing differences in climate change regulation between devel-
oped and developing or emerging economies, BCAs would likely primarily
affect the so-called BRICS and other developing countries.
Least developed countries (LDCs) could nevertheless be exempted, in order
to protect their fragile development. However, exceptions of this kind are
probably not the best course of action because LDCs would thus run the risk of
being altogether excluded from the decision-making process. Besides, risks of
trade infringement through LDCs are real in globalized and fragmented
production processes, where it is difﬁcult to track products and component
parts, and this would considerably weaken such a BCA mechanism.
4.2.4 Which Flows?
In order to address climate change effectively, most sectors should in theory be
subjected to environmental policies. Whether a given imported product is
liable in whole or in part to a BCA will, however, naturally depend on the
instrument in use (tax or TEP). Carbon markets cannot deal with all
7 An over-allocation of TEPs or a subsidization of these products could be complementarily
considered in order to ensure positive discriminatory treatment to those products and avoid
discouraging progressive investment in cleaner technologies.
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emissions, in particular small ﬁrms’ emissions, given the need to standardize
TEP. Taxing by tonne of emitted carbon equivalent would therefore seem
more appropriate, allowing for larger product coverage.
Attention should also be drawn to exports outside an environmentally regu-
lated area. A BCA can only restore a fair level of competition within a regulated
area. Protecting environmentally regulated businessesmay, for instance, involve a
total exemption on their exports. Such a measure, however, would most likely
encourage big emitter plants to produce for export markets, while lesser emitter
plants would concentrate on domestic regulatedmarkets. An option to avoid such
effect might be to base the adjustment level for exports on a uniform benchmark,
such as a BAT.
BCA implementation encounters, therefore, numerous practical and eco-
nomic difﬁculties, carbon cost evaluation being particularly challenging.8
However, these challenges, far from hampering BCA implementation, can
steer the design of such measure towards the most efﬁcient and fairest
emission reduction mechanism, on the way to clean energy transition. Due
to its effects on international competition and the international market, a BCA
would, of course, also need to be compatible with countries’ obligations in
respect to International Trade Law.
4 .3 BCAS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
A BCA adopted by a member of the WTO should comply with the obligations
undertaken by such member within the organization. The following sub-
sections brieﬂy present insights on the ways the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)9 allows contesting or legitimizing BCA mechanisms.10
4.3.1 Challenging a BCA under the GATT Principle
of Non-Discrimination
A core obligation established amongWTOmembers is the non-discrimination
principle. This principle is notably reﬂected in the ‘national treatment’ and the
8 To avoid these manageable challenges, France has devised the path to determine the level of
a BCA using the global GHG emissions volume per capita or per unit of gross domestic product
(GDP), rather than the amount of carbon contained in a product (OECD 2014).
9 For clariﬁcation purposes, questions regarding climate change within the WTO go beyond
the GATT framework, also reaching other WTO agreements. Moreover, a country wishing to
implement a BCA in its territory will need to comply with obligations it has also undertaken
under other international treaties, including bilateral and regional trade agreements.
10 As recalled by the OECD, ‘measures that attempt to correct for carbon leakage, such as
BCAs, are likely to be challenged by WTO members with export-oriented economies and
relatively lax carbon regulation’ (OECD 2014: 15).
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‘most favoured nation treatment’ obligations. With respect to trade in goods,
which is governed by the GATT, such obligations may be summarized as
follows:
• National treatment (article III of the GATT) prohibits discriminatory
treatment through internal taxes or other internal charges (article III: 2)
between national products and foreign products that are considered like
products or directly competitive or substitutable products. It also pre-
vents a WTOmember from applying a discriminatory treatment between
like national and foreign products through laws, regulations, and require-
ments (article III: 4) (GATT 1947: article III);
• The Most Favoured Nation treatment (article I of the GATT) requires
that a preference accorded to a product originating in or being exported to
aWTOmember be extended to similar products originating in or destined
for the territories of all other members (GATT 1947: article I).
Besides the non-discrimination principle, and in order to ensure market
opening and transparency, tariff restrictions are preferred to quantitative
restrictions (e.g., quotas, import or export licences). Indeed, according
to article XI of the GATT and subject to the exclusions foreseen in
that provision, WTO members are not allowed to adopt quantitative
restrictions to trade and quantitative restrictions must be administered in
a non-discriminatory manner (article III of the GATT). BCAs might be
associated to a quantitative restriction if a member decided to impose,
exclusively on importers, the obligation to buy quotas on the carbon
market, for example. It is, however, likely that a member would rather in
such a case establish a regulatory scheme applicable to its entire market,
including domestic producers, which would be examinable under article
III (OECD 2014: 19).
In case a BCA adopted by a WTO member is considered by another
member as altering the terms of competition existing in the international
market by granting beneﬁts exclusively to domestic producers, to the disad-
vantage of foreign producers, such BCAmechanismmight be contested before
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for alleged violation of the national
treatment obligation under the GATT. The WTO judge will ﬁrstly need to
assess whether the products at issue are ‘like products’ or ‘directly competitive
or substitutable products’ according to article III of the GATT. The ‘likeness’
of products is evaluated on a case-by-case basis in WTO law, according to
criteria taken from the GATT 1947 case law: ‘the product’s end-uses in a given
market; consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country;
the product’s properties, nature and quality’ (WTO 1996a: 20). Carbon-
intensity may be raised as a distinctive feature between a domestic and a
foreign product if a member demonstrates, for instance, that consumers have a
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preference for products with a lower carbon print, even if the products are
physically identical.11
It is also tenable that, as long as the BCA entails the same level of constraint
on importers and domestic producers, a BCA would not be discriminatory
under the GATT national treatment obligation and would comply with WTO
law in this regard. For instance, the GATT allows WTO members to apply a
tax adjustment at the border when it authorizes members to levy, at the
importation of a product, a charge equivalent to an internal tax, which directly
or indirectly affects national like products (article II: 2 (a) of the GATT). The
same rationale applies to tax adjustments at exportation when these adjust-
ments simply correspond to the exemption or refund of internal duties or
taxes applied to like products destined for consumption in the country of
origin or exportation. In practice, depending on the type of BCA, such
equivalency of treatment between domestic and foreign products can, how-
ever, be difﬁcult to demonstrate. A tax imposed on importers of goods while
national producers of like products are subject to a carbon market (and not a
tax) would probably be more difﬁcult to justify or to prove equivalency of.
In the event a BCA adopted by a WTO member was contested by another
member before the WTO judge based on the GATT national treatment obliga-
tion, the difﬁculties mentioned in Section 4.2 of this chapter would also
undoubtedly complicate the parties’ arguments and the assessment to be
made by the WTO judge (e.g., WTO-UNEP 2009: 101–3). In fact, in order to
evaluate the impact of a speciﬁc BCA on competitive foreign products, it would,
for instance, be necessary to measure precisely the carbon content of a product
and the foreign product it is compared to, as well as to justify the determination
of sectors and imported products, which are targeted by that BCA. On the other
hand, it is also defensible that those difﬁculties might become less signiﬁcant
with the progressive development and larger acceptance of norms and objective
BAT references for the calculation of carbon prints.
Based on the most favoured nation treatment obligation, violation of the
GATT might in addition be alleged with respect to differences in BCAs
applied according to the (foreign) targeted country of origin or destination
of a product. One of the exceptions to the most favoured nation treatment in
the WTO is the special and differential treatment in favour of developing
and least developed countries, enshrined in varied provisions of the WTO
Agreements.12 Its implementation is, nevertheless, dependent on certain
conditions. In fact, according to the WTO special and differential treatment,
11 This might be a difﬁcult task in practice, though. See OECD (2014: 16), which recalls that
‘some authors argue that market studies most often will show that consumers generally ignore
the processes and production methods (PPMs) of products’.
12 For an overview of the WTO special and differential treatment and recent discussions on
this theme, see WTO (2015).
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a member wishing to favour LDCs when deﬁning its BCA mechanism would
need to employ well-deﬁned and reasonable criteria, which would further-
more need to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner to every developing
country presenting the same circumstances.13
Finally, the choice of countries targeted by a BCA could also possibly be
challenged under the principle of ‘shared but differentiated responsibilities’,
recognized nowadays as a component of sustainable development (United
Nations 1992: Principle 7). In fact, this principle has been consecrated in the
UNFCCC and it is defendable that it has been integrated as well intoWTO law
through the concept of sustainable development, which is acknowledged as an
objective of the organization (WTO 1994: Preamble, emphasis added). Such
principle requires that different countries’ capacities, social and economic
situation, and historical contribution to climate change be taken into account.
It would therefore not be unlikely for a WTO judge assessing the design and
implementation of a BCA to consider those elements in their legal reasoning
and admit that the BCA may apply dissimilar treatment to different foreign
countries according to their speciﬁc circumstances and their historical contri-
bution to climate change.14
4.3.2 Resorting to the GATT General Exceptions Regarding
Health and Environment Protection
In the advent of a contested BCA brought before aWTO judge and considered
discriminatory by the latter, and therefore in violation of the GATT, the
member having adopted the BCA would likely attempt to justify it on the
grounds of the general exceptions under article XX of the GATT. These
general exceptions are part of the general balance of rights negotiated by
WTO members (EC—Hormones (DS26 and DS48) and US—Shrimp (DS58))
(WTO 1998a, 1998b) and aim, among others, to allow members to adopt
measures for health and environmental protection that might otherwise be
considered contrary to GATT obligations. Article XX (b) and (g) of the GATT
establish exceptions for measures ‘(b) necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health’ and ‘(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption’.
Article XX (b) requires the fulﬁlment of a necessity criterion, implying a
proportionality control of a measure with respect to the objective that a
13 See WTO (2004: §§ 160–7). For a brief chronological overview of the special and differ-
ential treatment at the WTO, see Richieri Hanania (2009: 137–40).
14 According to Morosini (2010: 717–25), border adjustment measures in the Waxman–
Markey Bill were inconsistent with WTO law, inter alia, because they did not respect the
principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities.
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member is pursuing, as well as the availability of alternative reasonable
measures that might be less restrictive to trade but as effective. Such inter-
pretation has been applied in the well-known cases Korea—Beef (DS161 and
DS169), EC—Asbestos (DS135), US—Gambling (DS285), and Brazil—
Retreaded Tyres (DS332), where the WTO judge explained that a measure
may be considered necessary based on the importance of the interest or value
it protects, its contribution to the materializing of the objective pursued
(effectiveness of the measure), and its degree of restriction to trade (WTO
2000: §§ 160). Once these conditions are all met, article XX (b) may be
considered applicable. When defending the non-applicability of article XX
(b) to a BCA, a WTO member would thus need to demonstrate that other
alternative, as effective and less trade restrictive options existed.
Regarding article XX (g), the expression ‘relating to’ has been interpreted as
meaning ‘primarily aimed at’ (US—Gasoline (DS2)) (WTO 1996b: 15–19),
which is larger than the notion of ‘necessary’. If a BCA is demonstrated to be
primarily aimed at environmental objectives (and not only competiveness
issues), article XX (g) might be considered applicable. Moreover, in the case
US—Shrimp (DS58), the WTO Appellate Body considered that the notion of
‘exhaustible natural resources’ should be read according to contemporary
concerns regarding the protection of the environment, as deﬁned in
recent international treaties (WTO 1998b: § 129). Such decision allows for
an evolutionary interpretation of general exceptions in the GATT and dem-
onstrates the WTO judge’s wish to take into account environmental objectives
as they are progressively established in International Law under the concept of
sustainable development. Environmental interests reﬂected in a BCA might
therefore be positively considered by the WTO DSB based on contemporary
environment-related concerns and recent climate change discussions.
However, the exceptions listed in article XX are to be interpreted together with
its introductory statement, the chapeau of article XX: a measure must not be
applied ‘in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a dis-
guised restriction on international trade’ (GATT 1947: article XX). In fact, should
the challengedWTOmember succeed in demonstrating that its BCAmechanism
conforms to one of the exceptions of article XX, the chapeau of that same article
would still require the WTO judge to verify how the contested measure has been
applied. In a few words, the WTO judge would need to examine, cumulatively, if:
• The defendant has attempted to cooperate with other members in a non-
discriminatory manner in order to diminish the trade restrictive effects
that the contested measure may have.
• The measure is sufﬁciently ﬂexible to account for different conditions
existing among countries, even if it is not required from a WTO member
to expressly anticipate individual conditions of each member.
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• The conception, the base principles, and the structure of the measure do
not testify to protectionist purposes. The environmental objectives of a
BCA will need to be particularly highlighted in order for a member to
respond to this condition.
While the GATT principles exposed in this section may guide the design of
a BCA, its consistency with WTO rules may only be considered on a case-by-
case basis. In case of a dispute on the matter, the WTO judge will necessarily
examine the economic features and obstacles identiﬁed in the preceding
sections of this chapter for each type of BCA, in order to assess their con-
formity to International Trade Law. Since their effects on international com-
petition and their complexity may be signiﬁcant, it is likely that, while certain
BCAs might be considered as responding to the conditions required under one
of the paragraphs of article XX, their acceptability according to the chapeau of
that same article might be problematic. Any attempt to elaborate a BCA that
respects WTO Law should therefore take into account the three cumulative
criteria listed here (pp. 71–2).
Based on the economic and legal aspects put forward in Sections 4.2 and 4.3,
the following section discusses the acceptability of BCAs from a political
sciences standpoint.
4 .4 THE POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF BCAS
IN THE CONTEXT OF ENERGY TRANSITION
The objectives stated in the COP21 agreement—that is, capping at 1.5°C–2°C
the global temperature increase, as well as the reference to carbon neutrality—
seem vague since no speciﬁc emissions reduction targets have been agreed
upon by the Parties to respond to the urgency in limiting global warming. The
only measure which can be viewed as relatively constraining are the ‘Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions’ (INDCs).
Consequently, the implementation of BCAs remains an effective tool for
countries ready to implement, or having already committed to, a bold energy
transition. BCAs can level the environmental commitment (INDC) among
countries facing similar responsibilities in climate change. Moreover, a well-
designed BCA should aim at answering the concerns of developed countries
while promoting growth in developing countries, and should be complement-
ed by sobriety policies.15
15 Referring to the principle of primary energy consumption reduction by using less of an
energy service, also called energy sparing, ‘sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of
consumption and production’ (COP21 Paris Agreement, Preamble), behavioural change, energy
saving, energy soberness, energy sobriety, and so on. The authors have chosen to use ‘sobriety’ in
72 Climate Policy
4.4.1 Energy Transition, BCAs, and Developing Economies
As BCAs are gaining more interest from both governments and academia, the
growing body of scientiﬁc literature has mainly focused on carbon leakage and
competitiveness issues. However, another obstacle to BCAs implementation
involves their potential consequences on developing economies. Indeed, BCAs
have also been interpreted as a commercial sanction towards developing
countries, making international negotiations related to this measure more
complicated. This question has become a recurring argument against BCAs,
but requires a more careful examination of the stakes for developing countries.
In an insightful analysis of climate change and trade policy, Mattoo and
Subramanian (2013) evaluate the different forms of BCAs and their conse-
quences from both a trade and an environmental perspective. The authors
suggest the ‘least undesirable’ form of a BCA: ‘[a] border tax adjustment based
on the carbon content in domestic production would broadly address the
competitiveness concerns of producers in high-income countries while inﬂict-
ing less damage on developing-country trade’ (Mattoo and Subramanian 2013:
113). To ensure developing countries do not remain vulnerable to trade policy,
the international climate change debate, rather than WTO negotiations alone,
should also cover international agreements on such trade impact.
At the global level, matters are much more intricate when considering the
energy transition and economic development nexus. Reframing the problem, and
therefore looking for viable solutions without hampering development oppor-
tunities, have become both necessary and urgent. Mattoo and Subramanian
propose to challenge what they dub the ‘narrative’ problem, that is the historical
perspective on the industrialized countries’ responsibilities in climate change and
the past ‘colonization of emissions space’ (Mattoo and Subramanian 2013: 1).
A decisive climate change issue for developing countries relates to technology
generation and transfer. Technology generation, diffusion, and management
policies are a key component of climate change mitigation and adaptation at
the global scale (IPCC 2014). Technological change, accelerated through inter-
national cooperation, could enable developing countries to meet emission re-
duction goals. This could be achieved by shifting from the sole ﬁnancing of
emission cuts to an investment in technology generation (Mattoo and
Subramanian 2013: 18). However, reaching consensus on international techno-
logical cooperation might prove to be as difﬁcult as achieving an agreement in
international climate negotiations. Considering the urgency of climate change
matters, the unilateral implementation of BCAs could represent, beyond a
the present study, the translation of the French term ‘sobriété’, because it best describes our
current energy overconsumption and its ‘hangover’ results. Sobriety differs from efﬁciency (or
efﬁcient energy use), which refers to using less energy for a constant service.
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palliative solution, a necessity. In fact, this type of measure could serve as an
instrument to discourage environmental dumping and promote international
involvement and signiﬁcant mitigation commitments (beyond INDCs) in the
framework of the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, resulting in an increase in
prices in developed countries, BCAs limit consumption in the North and leave
resources available for the South. As inequalities (of access to goods and of
income) exacerbate environmental damage, in turn further increasing inequal-
ities (UNDP 2011), BCAs could play an important role in promoting equity and
development. A BCAwould, therefore, be one step among others towards energy
transition and serious efforts in addressing climate change.
4.4.2 BCAs, an Available Tool to Reshape the World
Climate change issues, and environmental concerns at large, also present a
social dimension, which includes inequality and development issues related to
burden sharing, ultimately translated into the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities towards a carbon-free world.
In order to address that objective, green growth is often advocated, not as a
means but as an end, in different forms (sustainable and inclusive growth or
green economy). It entails the ‘greening’ of economic activities according to a
particular logic that starts with renewable energy and ends with energy
efﬁciency facilitated by technology. Yet this reasoning overlooks four essential
elements. First, economic activity is parameterized by our ability to produce
energy: the more energy per capita, the higher the growth potential in devel-
oped countries (Giraud and Kahraman 2014). Second, the ability to substitute
the primary carbon energy consumed for renewable energy depends on the
availability of materials needed for windmills or photovoltaic panels, as well as
on the pace of deployment of these systems (Roman 2014). Actually, the
historical energy return on investments rates are decreasing, all energies
considered, and more energy is needed to produce energy and to extract raw
materials, since the most accessible deposits have been or are becoming
depleted. Furthermore, if renewable energy systems are deployed too fast,
the newly created energy will be used for the production of other units of
carbon-free energy production, rather than substituting current polluting
energies (Pearce 2009). Third, the focus on renewable energy and energy
efﬁciency conceals the issues of energy embedded in products16 and ‘grey
energy’.17 Fourth, technological solutions may prove hazardous. The beneﬁts in
energy efﬁciency achieved through technological progress are real, but remain
16 Embedded energy is the energy needed to produce a given good.
17 Grey energy is the sum of embedded energy and all other forms of energy used throughout
the lifecycle of a given good until its recycling.
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insufﬁcient, particularly given the environmental urgency. In addition, the
rebound effect, process by which greater energy efﬁciency may lead to an
increased energy use (‘buy a more fuel-efﬁcient car, drive more’ rationale) is
another issue for technological developments. Finally, since innovation cycles
continue to be variable and unpredictable, waiting for a major innovation that
could completely change energy use seems too precarious.
For these reasons, sobriety policies are as necessary as renewable energies
and energy efﬁciency in order to achieve energy transition. Often disregarded
because it entails a strong political will, this policy concept challenges certain
aspects of economic growth. Sobriety policies aim indeed at classifying prod-
ucts according to utility and regulating their production and use. For instance,
organic farming based on agroecological principles should be promoted, given
the fact that such type of production of agricultural goods involves lower
inputs and fewer cleanup operations. This is where sobriety collides with
growth: any activity involving an over-consumption of energy or even envir-
onment cleanup operations contributes positively to the gross domestic
product (GDP).
The implementation of sobriety policies, followed by energy efﬁciency
policies, and the deployment of renewable energies,18 reverses the traditional
reasoning applied to climate policy and underlines the need for a strong,
compelling regulation. Dealing with the complexity of the economical–
environmental–social nexus, itself embedded in a ﬂuctuating international
context, national regulators must resort to various instruments to foster
deﬁnite changes in behaviour. BCAs are an essential component of this
array of instruments. They contribute to the development of more local,
thus ‘sober’ activities.
In addition, limiting transportation has become a necessity, as the COP21
French ambassador underlined (Tubiana 1991). Sea transportation is still not
subjected to emissions reduction and a recent emissions stabilization agreement
for air transportation agreed to at the International Civil Aviation Organization
contains no mention of objectives of 1.5°C–2°C, despite the need for greater
regulation of those sectors. Transport reduction policies, perhaps supplemented
by trade reduction policies, would encourage local production, circular econ-
omy,19 economy of functionality,20 and thus development, at any development
18 Sobriety policies and energy efﬁciency would reduce primary energy consumption by 66
per cent. As a result, the need for renewable energies would be considerably reduced, paving the
way to smoother raw materials sharing at the international level (Association NégaWatts 2011).
19 The main goal of circular economy is to enable the production of goods and services while
preventing excessive consumption and squandering of raw materials, and as to facilitate
recycling.
20 A functional economy is one that optimizes the use (or function) of goods and services and
thus the management of existing wealth (goods, knowledge, and nature). The economic objective
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stage. Again, BCAs may be seen as regulatory instruments available for the
national regulator to foster behaviour change.
Moreover, the implementation of BCAs transcends the stakes of competi-
tiveness and level playing ﬁeld issues. Seeking to reach an equitable distribution
of commitment, and considering the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities, it appears necessary to shift from national production-based
emissions counts to a consumption-based approach. Considering the amount of
GHG consumed rather than produced opens a fair route, between countries as
well as within social categories, and encourages sobriety behaviours. Addition-
ally, BCAs become incentive schemes for countries to adapt production to local
needs and rethink their environmental policy. BCAs would thus become an
essential component of social and environmental justice,21 helping to depart
from a business and macroeconomic logic.
In sum, BCA enforcement would be, in all likeliness, necessary, together
with paradigm shifts, breeding strong incentives to ease developing countries’
acceptance of this instrument. Also, funds collected via BCAs should be
reallocated to objectives such as the production of more sustainable goods,
innovation, technology, or skills transfer. The Green Climate Fund (GCF)
could equally be made the recipient of all or parts of these funds.
4 .5 CONCLUSION
The commitments agreed upon by the Parties during the COP21 should lay
the foundations for any energy transition strategy but also for economic
transition policies. However difﬁcult to meet, these commitments entail a
profound, and voluntary, transformation of our societies. The BCA mechan-
ism can enable our (over)consumption societies to move towards a sober, low-
carbon society, which uses energy and resources thoughtfully. BCAs turn out
to be more than a simple restraint towards a given trade partner. It is, actually,
a powerful means to share resources.
In fact, obstacles to climate negotiations are elsewhere. Developed countries
must assume their historical responsibilities in climate change through an
effective constraining commitment to limit emissions at the national level,
which entails important internal transformations to achieve energy transition
of the functional economy is to create the highest possible use value for the longest possible time
while consuming as few material resources and energy as possible.
21 Poverty and environmental destruction are highly correlated (Laurent 2011; Keucheyan
2014).
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effectively. They should respond to demands from developing and some
emerging economies for ﬁnancing, technology transfer, and sobriety policies.
Such requirements could be accommodated through the implementation of a
global carbon price. BCAs would be useful in balancing environmental efforts
with growing equity. Difﬁculties in implementation, which appear to be more
of an economic nature than legal or political, can be overcome. The French
proposal to apply BCAs according to the global GHG emissions volume per
capita or per unit of GDP, rather than the amount of carbon contained in a
product, seems to be not only feasible, but also fair since calculation would be
favourable to developing countries. The emission ratio by MWh created by the
International Energy Agency, which tracks average GHG emissions per coun-
try for each megawatt produced, could also be employed.
BCA implementation requires, nevertheless, a strong and durable political
commitment to environmental protection and its design calls for a careful
assessment of the numerous constraints exposed in this chapter.
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